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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
RALPH HADLEY, a Minor,
By REX HADLEY, his Guardian Ad Litem,
Plaintiff and Apellant
vs.
DOUGLAS

J.

No. 9007

WOOD,
Defendant and Respondent,

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was commenced by Ralph Hadley, a minor, through his guardian ad litem, against the defendant
to recover damages for personal in juries incurred by him
as a result of the defendant's negligent operation of an
automobile. <R.l,2) The defendant set up the defenses
of unavoidable accident and contributory negligence.

<R.6>

The collision occurred in a residential area of Ogden
City, Utah, on the west side of Polk Avenue in front of
the Wasatch elementary school, shortly before 3 o'clock,
Sunday afternoon, on the 9th day of January, 1955. (Tr.
8,13,39) The :Hadley boy with a companion, Steven
Branz, were sleigh riding down the hill in front of the
Wasatch School. (Tr. 130) At that time Ralph Hadley
was 6 years and 1 month old (Tr. 142) and Steven Branz
was 8 years old. (Tr. 133) Polk Avenue runs north and
south. The Wasatch School is on the east side of Polk
Avenue. <Tr. 9) Hadley, lying down on the sleight of
Steven Branz, slid down the hill in front of the Wasatch
School traveling in a westerly direction and across Polk
Avenue. The defendant Wood, driving his automobile
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alone in a southerly direction along Polk Avenue, collided
with the boy and sleigh on the west side of said Polk
Avenue. The boy was pinned between the front part of
the undercarriage of the car and the snow bank. <Tr.
130) He incurred the following injuries: Fracture of pelvis, fracture of right arm above elbow, fracture of lower
left leg, fracture of left femur or thigh, fracture of right
femur. <Tr. 84), and as a result thereof is afflicted in the
lower left extremity with a 15 per cent permanent partial
disability (Tr. 90) Medical expenses incurred amount to
$1,428.25.
At the close of plaintiff's case defendant made a motion for "a judgment of non-suit, dismissing the complaint," (Tr. 155) which was denied. <Tr. 156)
The jury found the issues in favor of the defendant,
no cause for action. <Tr. 209)
I:'laintiff moved the court for a new trial, <R. 16)
which was denied. <R.l7)
STATEMENT OF POINTS

I.
THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE EVIDENCE.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY.
ARGUMENT

I.
THE VERDICT IS AGAINST THE EVIDENCE.
The only issue before the jury other than damages
was the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff being
6 years old at the time is conclusively presun1ed to be incapable of contributory negligence. This point will be developed at number II hereafter.
2
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The evidence established the following conclusive,
unrebutted facts:
1. Sunday, the 9th day of January, 1955, was a cold
day with clear visibility. (Tr. 11,18,44,120)
2. There was snow in the area of the Wasatch
School by Polk Avenue. (Tr 11,130)
3.

Polk Avenue was slick and icy. (Tr.11,22,35,78)

4.

The streets were icy in the entire area. Tr.13)

5. There were children sleigh riding in the area.
(Tr.59,71,78,124)
6. There were sleigh tracks running east to west in
front of the Wasatch School to the curbing of Polk Avenue. (Tr.l2,27,45,46)
7. The distance of the sleigh riding hill was 122
feet. Tr.l38)
8.

The sleigh riding hill was steep. (Tr.1 0,26,45,

46)
9. The width of Polk Avenue was 35 feet. (Tr.l9)
10. There was a clear, unobstructed view from where
the defendant entered the shool area on Polk Avenue to
where the children were sleigh riding. (Tr.26,27)
11. The distance from where the defendant entered
the school area to where the children were sleigh riding
was on half block. (Tr.l6)
12. The Wasatch School is the only structure on the
east side of Polk Avenue. (Tr.l8)
13. There were no obstructions to view between de-·
fendant and plaintiff when he entered the school area.
(Tr.44)
14. The school area is surrounded by play areas.
<Tr.9)
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15. The approaches to the school area are marked
by warning signs. (Tr.10)
16. The defendant could have seen the Hadley boy
on the hill. (Tr .26,27, 131 )
17. The defendant had ample time to stop his vehicle at the speed he testified he was going had he seen
the plaintiff on the hill. (Tr.28,131)
·
18.

Traffic conditions were light. (Tr.30)

19. The Hadley boy was struck by the front of the
defendant's automobile. (Tr. 44,134)
20. It was the practice of some children to sleigh
ride down the hill in front of the Wasatch School and proceed west across Polk Avenue. (Tr.72,73)
21. Immediately after the collision the defendant admitted he had just run over a youngster. <Tr.76~77)
Steven Branz, who was sleigh riding with the plaintiff at
the time of the collision, gives this account of the event,
A. "Well, we were going down the hill from the top
and there was a little jump at the top so when
you went down, you made a jump just dropped a
couple of feet and start down the hill. As we went
down, we watched for cars at each end of _the
street and when we were coming up, I was ahead
of Ralph, and we were just about to the top and
he started down and there was a car and I shouted at him and he kept going and the car tried to
stop and it skidded and they both met, more or
less, as it hit the snowbank.

Q. When they met, was it the front part of the car
that met with Ralph on the sleigh?

A. Yes.
Q. Where was the car when you first saw it, do you
remember?
4
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A. Well, it was by the corner before, a little past the
corner.
Q. A little past, toward the school?

A. Yes.
Q. Boughton Street, is that the name of the street
by the school?
A. Yes." (Tr.l30,131)
The defendant testified and admitted the following
facts:
1. That he knew roads were slick. (Tr.l68)
2.

That there were no cars on the street. (Tr.l69)

3. That there were a few children around the area
of the Wasatch School. (Tr.l69)
4.

That the visibility was good. (Tr.l70)

5. That he was aware he was approaching a school
area. (Tr.l81)
6. That he saw some children on the side of the
hill. (Tr.l81)
7. That he did not look at the children again after
he had once seen them. (Tr.l83)
8. That had he seen the Hadley boy sooner he
could have avoided the accident. (Tr.l91)
9. That had he seen the boy coming down the hill
he would have brought the car under control. (Tr.l95)
The following is quoted from the testimony of the
defendant:

"Q. Were you aware of the fact that you were approaching a school when you came into this
Wasatch School area?

5
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A. Yes.

Q. Did you notice any children in that vicinity?
A. As I recall, there were some few children up on
the side of the hill there.
Q. And what side of the hill are you referring to?
A. That would be up on the east side." <Tr.l81)
"Q. Did you notice any other on the west side?
A. No, I didn't notice any on the west side.

Q. What were these children doing that were on the
east side?
A. They were just there. They were playing. I don't
know what they were doing. I was watching the
road.
Q. Then you didn't slacken your speed when you
got to this area where the school was. Is that
correct?
A. I don't recall." (Tr.l82)
"Q. And where were you particularly on Polk Avenue
when you first saw these children at the Wasatch
School?
A. Oh, they were off about like that (indicating).
THE COURT:

Will you indicate again?

A. Off on an angle, that is as near as I can remember, it has been four years.
THE COURT: The record may show that he indicates about a thirty degree angle from the front.

* * *
Q. Did you see a child on a sleigh coming down that
hill?
6
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A. No, I didn't.

Q. Did you look, did you keep looking in the area
where you had seen those children by the W asatch School, did you keep them in your vision
after you passed?
A. There was snowbanks on the side of the road and
the road was clear and I was watching the road.

Q. You were not watching these children then?

A. No.
Q. Good visibility, you said, right?
A. Yes.

Q. And the first time you saw young Hadley was
when he was just coming over what you call the
top of the snowbank?
A. Yes." (Tr.183 and 184)

"Q. Had you driven over that general area before,
Mr. Wood?
A. What do you mean, "before," ever?

Q. Yes. ever.
A. Yes.

Q. How many times, do you recall?
A. No, I don't recall." (Tr.l90)

"Q. If you had seen him coming down this hill and
were aware that he was coming down, could you
have avoided the accident. Isn't it possible that
you could have?
A. Well, if I had seen him coming down the hill,
possibly yes." (Tr.l91)

7
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"Q. And once again, isn't it true that if you had seen
the boy come down that hill, you could have
avoided that accident? I think you have answered
that once before.
A. If I had seen the boy coming down that hill, and
had known the boy was going to go across the
street, it is possible that I could have avoided the
accident." (Tr.l94)
"Q. Mr. Wood, if you had seen that boy coming down
the hill, you wouldn't have slackened your speed
or have tried to do anything until you saw him
come out of the snowbank. Is that right?
MR. MIDGLEY: I object to that on the ground that
it is argumentative.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. Answer
the question if you can.
A. Will you state that question again, please.
Q. In other words, if you had seen that boy coming
down the hill, you still would have done nothing
with reference to the control of your automobile
because you would have assumed that he was not
going to come across the street. Is that right? Is
that right?
A. Well, you don't normally jam your car in a snowbank unless you have an idea that something is
going to come in the road, not knowing whether
the boy would be going into the road, I don't
know that you would swerve, would you?
Q. You wouldn't have applied your brakes, you
wouldn't have tried to bring your car under control, under those circumstances?
A. If I had seen the boy coming, yes.
Q. You would?
8
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A. Yes.

Q. So if you had seen him sooner, it is possible that
you could have avoided the accident then?
A. It is possible.

Q. That is all." (Tr.195)
"Q. Isn't it true that you, that you didn't keep a lookout for these children, once you knew that they
were there. Isn't that true?
A. I was keeping my eyes on the road.
Q. You were not paying any attention to the children, you were keeping your eyes on the road.
Right?

A. That is a normal thing to do.

Q. Well, that is what you were doing, is it not?
A. As I remember, I was watching the road.

Q. That is all." (Tr.l97 and 198)
The answer sets out two defenses, that of contributory negligence of Ralph Hadley and that of unavoidable
accident. The first is without merit as a matter of law.
The second is eliminated by the admission of the defendant. The jury must render a verdict on evidence not on
bias, sympathy or conjecture. The facts establish as ·a
matter of law the negligence of the defendant in failing
to keep a proper lookout and in failing to keep his automobile under control, which negligence was the proximate
cause of the injuries of the plaintiff.

9
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
"No. IO <R.II) A person who is observing due
care for his own safety, has a right to assume
that others are possessed of normal facilities of
sight and hearing and that they will use them
in exercising ordinary care for their own safety
and the safety of others; and he has the right to
rely on that assumption, unless, in the exercise
of due care, he observes or should observe something to warn him to the contrary."
This imposed in effect the duty of due care on the
plaintiff.
"No. II <R.ll) The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. It is
the efficient cause, the one that necessarily sets
in operation the factors that accomplish the injury.
It may operate directly or through intermediate agencies or through conditions created by
such agencies.
The law does not necessarily recognize only
one proximate cause of an injury, consisting of
only one factor, one act, or the conduct of only
one person. To the contrary, the acts and omissions of two or more persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause of an injury, and in
such a case, each of the participating acts or omIO
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

missions is regarded in law as a proximate cause
and both may be held responsible."
The jury was thus told both may be held responsible.
"No. 13 (R.ll) When the negligent acts or
omissions of two or more persons, whether committed independently or in the course of jointly
directed conduct, contribute concurrently, and
as proximate cause, to the injury of another,
each of such persons is liable. This is true regardless of the relative degree of the contribution.
Where such concurrent negligence exists,
it is no defense for one of such persons that some
other person, not joined as a defendant in the action, participated in causing the injury.
Even if it should appear to you that negligence of that other person was greater in either
its wrongful nature or its effect."
The effect of this instruction was that where there
is concurring negligence each is liable.
There was no issue of concurrent or contributory
negligence raised by this case, nor was the plaintiff under
a duty of due care as defined in our law.
Nelson et ux v. Arrowhead Freight Lines, Limited.
Smith et ux v. same, 99Ut 129, 104 P2d 225, in quoted:
"It has been generally recognized that children
of tender years are so far undeveloped as to be relieved of the charge of negligence; that during
another period in their infancy there is rebuttable presumption against their capacity to understand and avoid danger; and that in the later
years of infancy there is rebuttable presumption
that they are chargeable with the same degree of

II
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care as are adults .. Ordinarily a child under seven
years of age is conclusively presumed not guilty
of contributory negligence.xxx"
This case quoted with approval.
Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Volume I, Section
99 (a), as follows:
"xxxThe question as to whether a child's capacity is such that it rnay be chargeable with contributory negligence is a question of fact for the
jury, unless so young and immature as to require
the court to judicially know that it could not
contribute to its own injury or be responsible for
its acts, xxx. Where the infant is under fourteen
years of age, the burden rests upon the defendant
to rebut the legal presumption of incapability of
contributory negligence.xxx"
The above Arrowhead case was cited with approval
in the case of Morby v. Rogers, 252 P2d 231, Ut; and was
cited as authority for holding a child 2 years and 8
months is conclusively presumed not guilty of contributory negligence in the case of Le Daux et ux v. Martinez
et al, 254 P2d 685, NM.
Where the only issue regarding liability properly
before the jury was whether the defendant was negligent
the effect of instructions indicating "both may be held responsible" and "each of such persons is liable" is error.
Although the court sought to properly state the
law in instruction 14 ( R.ll ) to the effect that, "the law
conclusively concludes that the child is incapable of the
judgment and attentiveness necessary to bring his own
misconduct to the magnitude that would justify an adult
12
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otherwise liable in successfully asserting contributory
negligence as a defense." It is clear that in view of the
conclusive state of the evidence and the erroneous instructions, it is clear that the jury based its verdict on the
negligence of the plaintiff.

CONCLUSION
Appellant prays that the case be remanded for a new
trial with instructions to the trial court to direct a verdict
for appellant and submit the case on the question of damages; or, in the alternative, for a new trial.

LAVAR E. STARK
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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